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Comments
NO ROOM FOR CHEERS: SCHIZOPHRENIC APPLICATION IN
THE REALM OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY PROTECTION
Did one look at what one saw
Or did one see what one looked at?
- Hart Crane1
I. INTRODUCTION
Andy Warhol's words ring immortal: "In the future everyone
will be world-famous for fifteen minutes."2 With the advent of a
colossal film industry that consists of movie production agencies,
actors and actresses, as well as merchandising moguls and distribu-
tors of commercial products for mass consumption, the legal world
has become entangled in a battle over celebrity rights and the level
of protection afforded by the courts. 3 For more than fifty years,
contradiction and confusion have defined the right of publicity in
the United States.4 The right of publicity has developed in re-
1. HART CRANE, HIEROGLYPHIC, COMPLETE POEMS OF HART CRANE 189 (Liver-
ight Marc Simon ed., 1989).
2. Andy Warhol, quoted inJ. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 908 (15th ed.
1980).
3. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953). Judge Frank reasoned:
For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons ... far from
having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses,
would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authoriz-
ing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in news-
papers, magazines, busses [sic], trains and subways. This right of
publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be made the
subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from us-
ing their pictures.
Id. at 868.
4. In an effort to distinguish the right of exclusive control over the commer-
cial exploitation of personality from the "right of privacy," the Second Circuit
coined the phrase "right of publicity" in 1953 in Haelan Labs, 202 F.2d at 868. Most
commentators and courts agree that the decision in Haelan marks the emergence
of the right of publicity. See, e.g., Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Matu-
ration of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 853, 854 (1995) (stating that "[tihe right of publicity as currently understood
was the product of the determination of the Second Circuit in Haelan Laboratories,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. "); H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commercial Exploita-
tion of Identity: A New Age for the Right of Publicity, 17 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 1, 2
(1992) (stating that "[t] he court suggested the label, 'right of publicity,' and by so
(121)
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sponse to the semiotic weight given to the commercialization of the
associative value of celebrity.5 Courts have said that the right of
publicity has been developed in order to protect the commercial
interest of celebrities in their identities.6 Unauthorized commer-
cial exploitation is the cynosure of the debate that surrounds the
elusive area of celebrity rights.7 Critics of this right, such as Judge
Kozinksi, argue that monopolies on celebrity fame stifle the crea-
tion of future celebrity images by preventing the use of old images
to inspire those that are new.8
In direct contrast to the right of privacy, which has fallen privy
to a bevy of skeptics and critics, courts and commentators have
doing, provided the legal theory that would help empower celebrities in the
emerging economic sphere being created by the entertainment, media and adver-
tising industries.").
5. See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125, 128-29 (1993). Madow states:
The fact that celebrities haul so much semiotic freight in our culture has
a number of important consequences. One such consequence-one with
which American law, in my view, has been unduly impressed-is that star
images enhance the commercial value of commodities with which they
are associated. Most obviously, celebrity sells cultural commodities: mov-
ies, records, videos, and so on. Since the early years of this century, when
the Hollywood "star system" first took hold, celebrity has been a vital fac-
tor of production in what Adorno and Horkheimer christened the "cul-
ture industry." Beyond this, however, we can distinguish three central
ways in which celebrity generates economic value. First, there is intense
demand for information about the lives and doings of celebrities-for
news stories, gossip items, biographies, interviews, docudramas. Second,
there is a large and increasingly lucrative market for merchandise (T-
shirts, posters, greeting cards, buttons, party favors, coffee mugs, school
notebooks, dolls, and so on) bearing the names, faces, or other identify-
ing characteristics of celebrities, living and dead. Third, as contemporary
advertising practice amply attests, celebrity enhances the marketability of
a wide array of collateral products and services.
Id. (citations omitted).
6. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating right of celebrity is mechanism to protect against commercial exploitation
of identity); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824-25
(9th Cir. 1974) (noting mental and economic injury to celebrity from appropria-
tion of identity with commercial value); Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F. Supp.
2d 587, 590 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (examining purpose of right of publicity); see also
Barbara A. Burnett, The Property Right of Publicity and the First Amendment: Popular
Culture and the Commercial Persona, 3 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 171, 173 (1990) (discussing
fight of publicity).
7. For a further discussion of commercial exploitation as being the cynosure
of current debate, see infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
8. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (denying petition for rehearing). Judge Kozinski argued
vehemently against the scope of protection that the right of publicity was attaining
and stated: " [s]omething very dangerous is going on here." Id. at 1513. "We give
authors certain exclusive rights, but in exchange we get a richer public domain.
The majority ignores this wise teaching, and all of us are poorer for it." Id. at 1517.
[Vol. 9: p. 121
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RIGHT OF PUBLICITY PROTECTION
more readily embraced the right of publicity. 9 The right of public-
ity is defined as a right that "protects against commercial misappro-
priation of one's name, likeness, or identity."10 A dense history of
complex cases adumbrates the need for a federal statute that pro-
vides guidance to the courts in order to preclude confusion and
dispute over a host of issues relating to celebrity and the associated
images seeking protection." Questions have emerged as to
whether publicity is a species evolving from a property right or a
personal privacy interest.1 2 Yet another bifurcating path arises with
the inquiry into whether right of publicity weaves its way into the
old torts of misappropriation and unfair competition. 13
This Comment argues that there is a need for a federal statute
or a definitive perspective within our nation's judicial system with
regard to the right of publicity. A statute would provide guidance
for the courts as they venture into a contradictory and confused
area that results in an inconsistent and unpredictable application of
the law. 14 Part II provides an overview of publicity rights within the
United States by beginning with a definition of celebrity 5 and the
justifications for affording celebrities right of publicity protection. 16
This section also examines the evolution of the right of publicity
and its distinction from the privacy doctrine.1 7 Part III of this Com-
9. See Halpern, supra note 4, at 853 (discussing right in value of identity).
Halpern concludes:
The Haelan opinion's recognition of a proprietary interest in personality
and the analytic work done over four decades adumbrate a right that is
predicated on significant societal interests and concerns. It is not hap-
penstance that the right of publicity has come to be articulated in the
Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition. There is, at bottom, recogni-
tion of the fact that there is something wrong, a manifest "unfairness,"
when one person seeks to trade on the personality of another.
Id. at 873.
10. Balaram Gupta, Names and Logos: Protection Under Intellectual Property Laws
and Consequences, 2 SPORTS LAwJ. 245, 264 (1995).
11. For a complete discussion of the need for a federal statute, see infra notes
147-66 and accompanying text.
12. See Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231, 1232-33 (N.D. Ohio 1983),
afftd, 765 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1985); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 429
(Cal. 1979).
13. See Richard Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A "Haystack in a Hurricane," 55
TEMP. L.Q. 977, 983-87 (1982).
14. For a further discussion of the need for a federal statute, see infra notes
147-66 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of what defines a celebrity, see infra notes 24-27
and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the justifications for the right of publicity, see
infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the evolution of the right of publicity doctrine,
see infra notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
2002]
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ment examines the right of publicity as affected by federal copy-
right law18 and First Amendment concerns. 19 Part IV presents the
Ninth Circuit's approach in Wendt v. Host International, Inc.2 0 as rep-
resentative of the expansive approach to the right of publicity.2 1
Part V proposes the need for a definitive perspective in the form of
a federal statute in order to bring uniformity and predictability to
this elusive area of law.22
II. PUBLIcITY RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
The right of publicity protects a celebrity's right against ex-
ploitation of his or her identity. 23 This protection begs the ques-
tion - who is a celebrity? In Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social
Change v. American Heritage Products, Inc.,24 the court concluded that
the term "celebrity" should be interpreted to encompass more than
the traditional categories of movie stars, sports players and rock and
roll stars. 25 An argument exists that defining celebrity is an exercise
rendered unnecessary if the right of publicity is examined in terms
18. For a further discussion of the federal copyright act as being utilized to
strike an adequate balance between public and private interests, see infra notes 81-
87 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of First Amendment concerns, see infra notes 115-
31 and accompanying text.
20. 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999).
21. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's expansive approach to the
right of publicity, see infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the need for a definitive perspective, see infra
notes 147-66 and accompanying text.
23. SeeJ. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A Trib-
ute, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1703, 1704 (1987).
24. 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
25. See id. at 683 (stating " [a] well known minister may avoid exploiting his
prominence during life ... [and] is [further] entitled to have his image protected
against exploitation after death . ); see also Hetherington, supra note 4, at 21.
Hetherington states:
This interpretation mirrors a societal reality which makes Andy Warhol's
assertion that "everybody will be world famous for 15 minutes" more of a
truism than a prophecy. A quick survey of morning television, airport
magazine racks and book store shelves will reveal an unlikely assortment
of celebrities which include corporate officers, law professors and just
about every line of work prefixed by "ex"-football coaches, test pilots,
Congressmen-who qualify for celebrity status by virtue of their second
careers as television pitchmen. Even the completely anonymous have
been catapulted onto the center stage of pop culture thanks to the will-
ingness of an advertising executive to take a chance on an unknown. All
of this bolsters the view that anyone whose identity commands value in
the commercial marketplace should qualify for protection under the "di-
rect commercial exploitation of identity" test.
Id. at 45-46.
[Vol. 9: p. 121
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RIGHT OF PUBLICITY PROTECTION
of a "direct commercial exploitation of identity test."26 This test
provides protection to anyone whose identity has been exploited
for commercial gain.27
The increasing focus on celebrities' rights is spawned by the
fascination of popular culture with the consumption of the en-
tertainment industry.28 As harbingers of tremendous revenue, ce-
lebrities' pecuniary interests in monitoring the authorized and
unauthorized use of their names, images, likenesses, and other indi-
cia of identity become particularly important.2 9 Celebrities often
generate colossal revenues by marketing techniques that include
endorsement of products, special appearances and merchandising
products that bear their defining characteristics. 30 Accordingly, an
assumption exists that celebrities have a strong interest in protect-
ing their identity when the upshot of their doing so involves reap-
ing huge profits and maintaining their public reputation.31
26. See Hetherington, supra note 4, at 46. Under this line of reasoning, any-
one whose identity has been directly exploited commercially and misappropriated
gains entrance into the echelon of celebrity for right of publicity purposes. See id.
Thus, the only remaining question is proof of damages and/or irreparable harm
warranting equitable relief. See id. In evaluating whether an identity has been di-
rectly exploited commercially and misappropriated, Hetherington argues that in-
dustry practice and ethical codes of conduct become relevant inquiries in assessing
proof of damages. See id. at 48. She further argues that inferences may be drawn
based upon an examination of facts and surrounding circumstances that include,
but are not limited to, "internal business documents, meeting minutes and con-
duct consistent with an intent to misappropriate elements of a celebrity's identity
for direct, commercial gain." Id.; see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding, without defining celebrity, that "defendants here for
their own profit in selling their product did appropriate part of [Midler's] iden-
tity"); Lombardo v. Doyle Dane & Bernach, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)
(Titone and Suizzi, JJ., concurring).
27. See Hetherington, supra note 4, at 46.
28. Theodore Adorno & Max Horkheimer, The Culture Industry: Enlightenment
as Mass Deception, in MAss COMMUNICATION AND SOCIETY 349 (James Curran et al.
eds., 1977).
29. See generally Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203, 218-23 (1954) (discussing early cases regarding ight of publicity).
30. See Larry Rohter, Pop-Music Fashion Becomes a Sales Hit, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 8,
1991, at DI. Rohter reports that annual revenues derived from music merchandis-
ing is over a half-billion dollar industry. See id. Music merchandising includes the
sale of paraphernalia bearing the names, faces or logos of musical groups and
popular performers. See id.
31. Some courts have expanded right of publicity protection to include many
forms of publicity promotions. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971
F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing viable right of publicity claim where
robot used in advertisement); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th
Cir. 1988) (permitting claim of voice misappropriation); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.
Supp. 723, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (enjoining distribution of magazine containing
nude portrayal of plaintiff).
2002]
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Several arguments are propounded in support of the right of
publicity. 32 First, proponents argue that the artist who achieves ce-
lebrity status is entitled to property rights associated with his or her
identity because of the labor expended to attain celebrity status. 33
Additionally, offering protection for this right provides artists and
actors with a significant incentive to spend sufficient time and re-
sources for the development of skills necessary to achieve public
recognition. 34 Second, unjust enrichment of those who have not
contributed to the publicity value of the celebrity's image is pre-
cluded. 35 Third, celebrities are given the opportunity to protect
the market value of their publicity when self-interested entrepre-
neurs are prevented from exploiting publicity value.36 Lastly, right
of publicity proponents propose that the "twilight zone" of copy-
right law, which fails to distinguish between the character itself and
the character's features and characteristics portrayed, is adequately
addressed by the right of publicity. 37
The substantive criticism against offering right of publicity pro-
tection is rooted in the conception that right of publicity stifles cul-
tural dialogue38 by furthering celebrities' capitalization on their
32. See Sudakshina Sen, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of Public-
ity, 59 ALB. L. REv. 739, 739-40 (1995) (discussing several arguments raised that
justify right of publicity); Michael Madow, supra note 5, at 167 (suggesting right of
publicity finds origins in frustration over right of privacy).
33. See Madow, supra note 5, at 179-96 (discussing property right associated
with celebrity status).
34. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 441 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
35. See id. at 444-45 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (propounding view that protecting
one's likeness while portraying character may be of paramount importance); see
also Kevin S. Marks, An Assessment of the Copyright Model in Right of Publicity Cases, 70
CAL. L. REv. 786, 789 n.13 (1982).
36. See Marks, supra note 35, at 789 n.13.
37. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978);
Lerman v. Chuckeleberry Pub., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Kenneth E. Spahn,
The Right of Publicity: A Matter of Privacy, Property, or Public Domain?, 19 NOVA L. REv.
1013, 1018 (1995).
38. See Madow, supra note 5, at 239 (stating that right of publicity constricts
"[O]ur cultural common, [which should be] freely available for use in the creation
of new cultural meanings and social identities, as well as new economic values.").
[Vol. 9: p. 121
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RIGHT OF PUBLICIrY PROTECTION
fame.39 Eighth Circuit courts, however, continue their recognition
of such protection. 40
The right of publicity was formulated as a solution to the
widening gyre of problems associated with celebrities as they at-
tempted to assert the right of privacy and the tort of appropriation
in order to protect the pecuniary interests in their images. 41 Pecu-
niary interests contradict celebrities' personal interests in prevent-
ing unauthorized commercial use of names or likeness that causes
embarrassment or humiliation. 42
William Prosser's seminal article on the right of privacy divides
the right into four different categories of tort: (1) intrusion; (2)
appropriation; 43 (3) disclosure; and (4) false light, of which the
39. See, e.g., William M. Heberer III, Comment, The Overprotection of Celebrity: A
Comment on White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 729,
750 (1994); ToddJ. Rahimi, Comment, ThePowerto Control Identity: LimitingA Celeb-
rity's Right to Publicity, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 725, 747 (1995) (noting argument
that right of publicity protection will result in what Judge Kozinski calls "impover-
ishing of the public domain"); Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc. 's Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of
Free Speech, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1189, 1213-14 (1995); Fred M. Weiler, Note, The Right
of Publicity Gone Wrong: A Case For Privileged Appropriation of Identity, 13 CARDozo
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 223, 243 (1994).
40. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969) (recog-
nizing celebrity images as having property value).
41. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d
959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that right of publicity remains business right to
control use of one's identity in commerce rather than personal right to be left
alone); WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971) (right of publicity
differs from law of privacy from which it finds its origins).
42. See Nimmer, supra note 29, at 207-08.
43. See generally Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, the Right of Publicity, and a
New Federal Statute, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 183, 188 (1990). Robinson com-
pares publicity rights to the tort of appropriation as such:
An action for the privacy tort of appropriation can be brought where a
defendant makes unauthorized use of a plaintiffs identity for commercial
purpose or private gain. In this respect, appropriation and the right of
publicity are identical. Two key differences, however, weaken appropria-
tion's usefulness as a publicity rights defense. According to William Pros-
ser, the privacy tort of appropriation requires both the unauthorized use
of the plaintiff's identity and injury to the plaintiffs dignity or self es-
teem. As seen in Haelan, where the harm is strictly economic, the ab-
sence of emotional or physical distress makes it impossible to prevail on
an appropriation claim.
Id. (citations omitted). Robinson also examines a second critical difference found
in appropriation's function as a branch of privacy law by delineating personal
rights as privacy rights, not property rights. See id. The fundamental difference
between personal rights and property rights is that personal rights are not freely
alienable, transferable or descendible. See id. at 189.
2002]
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right of publicity is mentioned in the second tort of appropria-
tion.4 4
A. The Realm of Protection
First coined in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Tapps Chewing Gum,
Inc.,45 right of publicity was recognized in addition to and indepen-
dent of right of privacy. 46 Haelan contracted with a number of pro-
fessional baseball players to have the exclusive right to use their
images on baseball cards Haelan produced.47 The players agreed
to refuse any other manufacturer a similar right.48 Despite this
agreement, Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., a rival of Haelan in the base-
ball card and chewing gum industry, deliberately induced the base-
ball players to authorize the use of their photographs for their own
cards in contravention of Haelan's contracts. 49 Haelan could not
preclude Topps from using the players' images on privacy grounds
because the players did not grant Haelan the right to sue on their
behalf and could not show that they had suffered mental distress. 50
Nevertheless, the court found for Haelan on the grounds that "in
addition to and independent of that right of privacy.., a man has a
right in the publicity value of his photograph."51 In effect, when
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS §§ 6521, 652A-6521 cmt. a (1977);
William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 398-401 (1960) (discussing false light
in public eye as form of invasion of privacy). Prosser's wholesale discussion of his
fight of privacy framework into the Restatement (Second) of Torts instigated discussion
of the creation of a separate right of publicity, which culminated in the inclusion
of the right of publicity in the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the
Law of Unfair Competition. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652I.
45. 202 F.2d 866, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1953). Judge Jerome N. Frank said:
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy
(which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the public-
ity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege
of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made "in
gross," i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything
else .... This right might be called a "right of publicity."
Id. at 868.
Earlier case law similarly refused to recognize such right. See, e.g., Roberson v.
Rochester Folding-Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447-48 (N.Y. 1902) (declining to recog-
nize woman's right against unauthorized use of her portrait in campaign to pro-
mote flour sales).
46. See Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868.
47. See id. at 867.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 868.
51. Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868. The court further stated that the publicity
right of the photograph, i.e., the right to grant exclusive privilege to publish his
picture, could be validly granted "in gross." See id.
[Vol. 9: p. 121
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Haelan contracted with the players for the exclusive right to pub-
lish their images, Topps was precluded from doing likewise. 52
Courts appear reluctant to hold explicitly that the right of pub-
licity may extend to the protection of characters, though numerous
decisions have granted an actor protection from exploitation of his
or her character. 53 Additionally, courts are reluctant to grant a ce-
lebrity a property interest in a character to which the actor has no
legal rights. 54 Protection of characters, rather, is evaluated at the
point when the character's protection becomes most compelling
and in terms of whether: (1) the actor portrays himself or herself as
52. See id. at 868-69.
53. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 842 (6th
Cir. 1983) (stating that characters should receive right of publicity protection);
Price v. Worldvision Enters., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252, 257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (dis-
cussing greater likelihood that right of publicity protection be afforded to fictional
characters created by actors). In Price, the court held the defendant's use of the
characters violated a previously issued injunction that prohibited the defendants
from impersonating Laurel and Hardy's "physical likeness of appearances, cos-
tumes and mannerisms, and/or the simulation of their voices, for advertising or
commercial purposes, including their use in, or in connection with... the produc-
tion of animated cartoons or motion pictures...." Price, 455 F. Supp. at 257-58; see
also Rogers v. Grimaldi and MGM/UA Entm't Co., 695 F. Supp. 112, 124 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (stating that commercial exploitation of character would justify right of pub-
licity protection); Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(recognizing celebrity may be exploited by his character and extending right of
publicity protection to characters identifying actors who create and portray them).
In Rogers, the Southern District of New York addressed whether Ginger Rog-
ers' right of publicity was violated by defendants' distribution and production of a
film in which the characters were dancers imitating Fred Astaire and Ginger Rog-
ers. See Rogers, 695 F. Supp. at 113. The characters called themselves "Fred and
Ginger." See id. at 114. Rogers substantive claim was that the film, "Frederico Fel-
lini's 'Ginger and Fred,'" misappropriated her public personality, which she devel-
oped via elegant ballroom dancing in some seventy-three motion picture films with
her most renowned role as Astaire's partner. See id. at 113-14. Despite the fact that
the court did not reject the contention that Roger's right of publicity could be
violated through appropriation of her elegant ballroom dancing character, the
court held that because the film did not use Rogers' name for commercial pur-
pose, her right of publicity claim should be dismissed. See id. at 124. Although the
court did not grant Rogers right of publicity protection, the opinion stands for the
viability of an actor's right of publicity claim against a defendant who commercially
exploits a character based on an actor. See id.
54. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players, 805 F.2d 663,
679 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that right of publicity actions cannot be brought
against unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, as actors do not own any rights in
these works effecting preemption by Federal Copyright Act); Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431-35 (Cal. 1979) (same); Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. App.
4th 1911, 1919-25 (1996) (same).
20021
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a character;55 (2) the actor creates the character; 56 (3) the charac-
ter is based on the actor;57 (4) the actor plays a character with the
same name, but with fictional elements; 58 (5) the actor plays a char-
55. This situation presents the strongest argument for right of publicity's ex-
tension for the protection of character misappropriation. A character shares an
actor's identity when an actor plays himself or herself as a character. An illustra-
tion of when an actor plays himself or herself in a role is that of a game or talk
show host. In the aforementioned scenario, the character and actor share the
same name and are not obligated to a scripted dialogue. Furthermore, the charac-
ter and actor share a common personality, mannerisms and speech patterns that
may be lacking when an actor plays the role of a character bound to the limitations
of a script.
56. See Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 425. Justice Mosk stated in his concurrence:
I do not suggest that an actor can never retain a proprietary interest in a
characterization. An original creation of a fictional figure played exclu-
sively by its creator may well be protectible. Thus, Groucho Marx just
being Groucho Marx, with his moustache, cigar, slouch and leer, cannot
be exploited by others. Red Skelton's variety of self-devised roles would
appear to be protectible, as would the unique personal creations of Ab-
bott and Costello, Laurel and Hardy and others of that genre.
Id. at 432 (Mosk,J., concurring) (citations omitted). In Lugosi, the descendants of
Bela Lugosi sought to recover profits made by Universal Pictures' efforts to com-
mercially license the Count Dracula character. See id. at 426. Even though other
actors such as Christopher Lee, Don Chaney and John Carradine had also played
Count Dracula, the items in contention were modeled after the likeness of Bela
Lugosi. See id. at 427. The court's analysis and ultimate decision turned on the
issue of whether the right to exploit one's image is a personal right that can only
be exercised during one's lifetime. See id. at 429-30. In holding that such right is
personal, Justice Mosk propounded that an actor may only possess a proprietary
interest in an "original creation" played by its "creator." See id. at 431; see also Allen,
610 F. Supp. at 612 (recognizing celebrity may be exploited by his character, thus
supporting position that right of publicity protection should extend to characters
identifying actors who create and portray them). Identification of whether an ac-
tor is exploited can be determined by whether an actor can create a unique fic-
tional character or a unique character trait common to all characters played. See
id.
57. In some situations, a casting director may call an actor to play a character
based upon the allure of the actor's identity, while maintaining the integrity of a
character unlike the actor's past roles. For a discussion of where right of publicity
cases have also arisen in these types of casting situations, see supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
58. This category is similar to where a character is based upon an actor with
the addition of developing the character not in relation to the actor's persona, but
rather based upon fictional elements. Examples of this type of casting and charac-
ter development include the sitcom Seinfeld and The Cosby Show, in which the char-
acters reflect the real lives of the actors, but with fictional elements. In White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), for example,
the defendant Samsung developed advertisements depicting a robot dressed in a
wig, gown and jewelry that resembled Vanna White's hair and dress while posi-
tioned in front of a Wheel-of-Fortune like game board. See id. at 1396. The adver-
tisement was captioned: "Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D." Id. The Ninth
Circuit held in favor of Vanna White in deeming that her right of publicity had
been violated. See id. at 1397-99. Although the robot itself did not resemble White,
the wig, dress and position in front of the game board engendered a resemblance
to White's identity. See id.; see also PROSSER, supra note 41, at 401-07. Professor
Prosser explained right of publicity as such: "[I]t is not impossible that there might
10
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acter with the same first name, but with fictional elements;59 and
(6) the actor plays a character who is dissimilar to himself or her-
self, but has become associated with the character. 60
B. The Evolution of the Right of Publicity: Justifications Arising
from Privacy Law
The right of publicity permits a celebrity to obtain relief
against a defendant who unauthorizedly uses a celebrity's name,
likeness or identity for commercial purposes. 61 A property-based
concept at heart, the right of publicity finds its origins in privacy
be appropriation of the plaintiffs identity, as by impersonation, without the use of
either his [or her] name or his [or her] likeness, and that this would be an inva-
sion of his [or her] right of privacy." Id. at 389.
59. The difference between this category and the previous one is a change of
the character's last name. For instance, Tony Danza frequently brings his own
name to the characters that he plays in shows such as Taxi, Who's the Boss, and The
Tony Danza Show. See Eonline, Tony Danza, at http://www.eonline.com/Facts/Peo-
ple/Bio/0,128,4002,00.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2001). The Third Circuit ad-
dressed the specific issue of whether right of publicity protection extends to an
actor's character of the same first name in McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 914
(3d Cir. 1994). In that case, George McFarland played the character "Spanky" in
the Our Gang series and came to be known as "Spanky McFarland" in recognition
of this character. See id. at 915. The Our Gang series is described as: "The series'
foundation was pitting scruffy, mischievous have-not kids against pretentious rich
kids, sissy kids, and in general a hardened, rule-governed, class-conscious adult
world that would stand between them and the only thing they were interested in-
making their own fun." Id. at n.3 (citing Leonard Maltin & Richard Bann, THE
LIrrLE RAscALs: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OUR GANG 4 (1992)). McFarland brought
suit for infringement on his right of publicity against a restaurant operating under
the name "Spanky McFarland's" that used pictures of, and referenced the Little
Rascals and Our Gang characters in its decor and menu. See id. at 916. The Third
Circuit held that "where an actor's screen persona becomes so associated with him
that it becomes inseparable from the actor's own public image," an actor may have
a cause of action for infringement of his or her right of publicity by appropriating
a character. Id. at 920. Citing the decision in Lugosi, the court reasoned that "the
actor who develop[s] the image [has] the right to exploit it as superior to third
parties which [have] nothing to do with the actor or the character identified with
the actor." Id. at 921. The cynosure of the court's analysis relies on the fact that
both the character and the actor possessed the same name, rather than on who
first acquired the name "Spanky." See id. at 922.
60. This category identifies the situation where a character who has become
"so associated with [the actor] that [the character] becomes inseparable from the
actor's own public image, [thereby giving] the actor ... an interest in the image
which gives him [or her] standing to prevent mere interlopers from using it with-
out authority." McFarland, 14 F.3d at 920. A notable point is that the actor may be
able to develop a proprietary interest in his or her character when the actor brings
an essence of originality to the role. See id. at 920. This requirement, however,
may be criticized on the grounds that the "invention" requirement loses sight of
the goal underlying the right of publicity, which is to protect actors from the com-
mercial exploitation of their identities. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp.
1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995); see also
Madow, supra note 5, at 127-29. Typical examples of persons entitled to right of
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law, which was developed in the late nineteenth century and incipi-
ently discussed in a 1890 article by Samuel Warren and Louis Bran-
deis. 6 2 Warren and Brandeis argued that the law should recognize
a "right to be let alone. ' 63 The article focused on the need to pro-
tect those suffering harm due to public disclosure of private facts. 64
Under a tort theory, protection was needed from disclosure in
newspapers, editorials, books and photographs for which no legiti-
mate public interest was deemed to be served. 65 It is precisely this
notion that spurred the recognition of a cause of action when one's
name or likeness was used for commercial purposes without con-
sent. Though courts generally upheld the essence of the Warren-
Brandeis privacy notion, some courts began to view the privacy ra-
tionale as being ill-suited to situations in which celebrities brought
a cause of action over unauthorized uses of their likeness in the
commercial context.66 Due to privacy law's focus on "the right to
publicity protection include famous actors, entertainers and professional athletes.
See Madow, supra note 5, at 128-33.
62. See Lee Goldman, Elvis is Alive, But He Shouldn't Be: The Right of Publicity
Revisited, 1992 BYU L. REV. 597, 599 (1992).
63. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890) (discussing right to privacy doctrine).
64. See id. at 196, 215-16. The privacy right focused on an individual's injured
feelings whose private details were exposed for public consumption, and thus was
categorized as more of a mental anguish than a property-based tort. See, e.g.,
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir.
1996) (noting right of publicity not only finds roots in privacy doctrine but also in
business right to control use of identity in commerce rather than personal right or
to maintain privacy); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(recognizing characterization of right of privacy as limiting right of person 'to be
left alone' and protecting commercial exploitation of sentiments, thoughts and
feelings of individual); Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 504 (Ga. Ct. App.
1966) (distinguishing between privacy right and property rights for commercial
exploitation); see also 4J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UN-
FAIR COMPETITION § 28:01 [3], 28-7 to -8 (4th ed. 1999) (analyzing disparity be-
tween privacy and publicity rights). McCarthy states:
The appropriation type of invasion of privacy, like all privacy rights, cen-
ters on damage to human dignity. Damages are usually measured by
,mental distress'-some bruising of the human psyche. On the other
hand, the right of publicity relates to commercial damage to the business
value of human identity. Put simplistically, while infringement of the
right to publicity looks to an injury to the pocketbook, an invasion of
appropriation privacy looks to an injury to the psyche.
Id.
65. SeeJames H. Barron, Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 193 (1890) Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 916
(1979). See generallyJ. THOMAS McCARTH', THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY
(West Group, 2001).
66. See Nimmer, supra note 29, at 204-06; see also O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.,
124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941) (rejecting privacy claim because plaintiffs pecu-
niary interests outweighed desire to protect privacy).
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be left alone," celebrity plaintiffs did not find protection in in-
stances where the court found that plaintiffs pecuniary interests
outweighed good faith concerns over maintaining their private in-
tegrity.6 7 Privacy law, therefore, focuses on the personal dignity of
an individual.68
In response to the growing inadequacy of privacy law as ap-
plied to the quickly increasing commercial and economic value of
celebrity status 69 arose the right of publicity doctrine as suggested
by Melville Nimmer.70 Nimmer, a renowned legal commentator,
suggested that the right of publicity is the "right of each person to
control and profit from the publicity values which he has created or
purchased. '71 Nimmer intimated that celebrities' recognizable
names and likeness carried considerable economic value when used
for the commercial enterprise of the promotion and sale of goods
and services resulting from the celebrity's expenditure of time,
money and effort to achieve public status. 72 Following this line of
reasoning, granting a right of publicity to these celebrities com-
ports with the labor principle that something of value is entitled to
the fruits of its economic gain. 73 Thus, the celebrity creates a prop-
erty to which there is attached a bundle of rights.74 Essentially,
67. See O'Brien, 124 F.2d at 168-70 (determining O'Brien was not entitled to
right of privacy protection); see also Patricia B. Frank, White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc.: The Right of Publicity Spins Its Wheels, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115, 1115
(1994) ("Since the 1950s, American law has recognized a property right in a per-
son's publicity as 'the right of each person to control and profit from the publicity
values which he has created."') (quoting Nimmer, supra note 29, at 216); Steven C.
Clay, Note, Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal
Courts, 79 MINN. L. REv. 485, 488 (1994) ("Some courts were reluctant to apply
privacy rights to celebrities, stating that celebrities waived any right 'to be let alone'
through their active pursuit of and profit from fame.").
68. See Robinson, supra note 43, at 184-85 (defining right to privacy frame-
work as personal in nature).
69. See Nimmer, supra note 29, at 203 (discussing inadequacies of privacy law
doctrine); Robinson, supra note 43, at 184 ("The right of publicity was conceived as
a solution to the problems caused when celebrities attempted to use the right of
privacy, and/or the tort of appropriation, to protect pecuniary interests.").
70. See Nimmer, supra note 29, at 203-04.
71. Id. at 216.
72. See id. at 215-16.
73. See id. at 216.
74. SeeJOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk. II, §§ 25-51, at 285-
302 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967). Locke's theory of natural law proposes the
notion that the expenditure of labor lays a foundation for property rights. See id.;
see also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individual-
ism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993) (dis-
cussing relationship between Locke's theory and law of intellectual property).
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Nimmer proposed the idea that the foundation for a right of pub-
licity claim does not truly exist within the right of privacy.75
In his seminal article on right of publicity,7 6 William Prosser
divided the right of privacy into four separate torts: (1) "Intrusion
upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs;
(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plain-
tiff; (3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye; and (4) Appropriation for the defendant's advantage of
the plaintiffs name or likeness."77 In his discussion, Prosser fo-
cused largely on name and likeness appropriations, 78 though not-
ing that extension beyond this realm was entirely possible: "[I] t is
not impossible that there might be appropriation of the plaintiffs
identity, as by impersonation, without the use of either his name or
his likeness, and that this would be an invasion of his right of pri-
vacy."' 79 Thus, not only can the evolution of the publicity doctrine
be traced to the privacy doctrine, but it also finds strong roots
within it.8 °
75. See Nimmer, supra note 29, at 203-04. Nimmer stated:
Well known personalities connected with these industries [including the
advertising, motion picture, television and radio] do not seek the "soli-
tude and privacy" which Brandeis and Warren sought to protect. Indeed,
privacy is the one thing they do "not want, or need." Their concern is
rather with publicity, which may be regarded as the reverse side of the
coin of privacy. However, although the well known personality does not
wish to hide his light under a bushel of privacy, neither does he wish to
have his name, photograph, and likeness reproduced and publicized
without his consent or without remuneration to him.
Id. (citations omitted).
76. See Robinson, supra note 43, at 185 (acknowledging adoption of Prosser's
right of privacy framework into RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS as having
'spurred discussion of the creation of a separate right of publicity"); Clay, supra
note 67, at 490 (identifying Prosser as universally cited in right of publicity cases).
77. Prosser, supra note 44, at 389.
78. See id. at 401. Many courts look to Prosser's discussion of right of publicity
as one of the earliest and most enduring articulations of the common law right.
See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992); see
Burnett, supra note 6, at 175-76 (discussing Prosser's theories on privacy doctrine
as root of publicity doctrine).
79. Prosser, supra note 44, at 401 n.155. Prosser further states that the misap-
propriation tort was distinguishable from the others on the grounds that it was
more of a proprietary tort than one of mental anguish. See id. at 406-07.
80. See Hetherington, supra note 4, at 4 ("The seeds of celebrity rights lay in
the novel doctrine of privacy.").
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III. AN OVERLAP OF A HOST OF ISSUES: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
ON THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND FIRST
AMENDMENT CONCERNS
A. The Federal Copyright Act: The Fair Use Model
Though the right of publicity is currently recognized as a legal
doctrine independent from notions spurred by privacy law, legisla-
tures and courts face a precarious balance between private and pub-
lic sectors as to the scope of the protections allowed. In the face of
celebrity rights exploitation, the exigency of a workable model be-
comes increasingly evident.8 1 The right of publicity is evolving to-
ward the protection of a celebrity's identity beyond the traditional
scope of name, photograph and likeness.8 2
In striking an adequate balance between public and private in-
terests, courts theoretically favor the fair use doctrine as codified by
the 1976 Copyright Act.83 In order to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,"'84 copyright law in the United States grants
exclusive control rights to creators of "original works of author-
ship"85 that include literary, musical, artistic, dramatic and certain
other works. Courts have generally adhered to the view that grant-
ing financial rewards are the optimal means to encourage repro-
duction of creative works, while alluring the original author to
maintain exclusive entitlement to their work.8 6 Copyright, there-
fore, provides the necessary incentives and protections to promote
the production of new works.8 7
The origins of American copyright law derive from the English
scheme of copyright protection, originally enacted in 1710 as the
81. For a further discussion of the exigency of a workable right of publicity
statute, see infra notes 147-66 and accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of the scope of protection of right of publicity, see supra
notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
83. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2001).
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (West, 2001).
86. See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1218
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
87. See Benjamin Ely Marks, Copyright Protection, Privacy Rights, and the Fair Use
Doctrine: The Post-Salinger Decade Reconsidered, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1376, 1376-77
(1997). Marks examines Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987),
a case in which the Second Circuit granted J.D. Salinger an injunction barring the
publication of the author's biography. See id. at 1376. The Second Circuit's deci-
sion was a part of a controversial line of cases revolving about copyright infringe-
ment law and the fair use doctrine. See id. These cases engendered a plethora of
criticism and activity by Congress among the legal community, publishers and aca-
demics who believed that the decision narrowed the fair use doctrine. See id.
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Statute of Anne.88 Since this time, Congress has passed a number
of copyright statutes to meet the dual purposes of copyright law.89
To stimulate creativity, copyright law provides economic incentives
to creators by granting the author exclusive control over an origi-
nal, expressive work.90
Adequate economic incentives are usually provided to an au-
thor to create original works and share them with the public be-
cause a copyright monopoly grants rights of exclusive control to
reproduce, distribute and display a work.91 However, because the
copyright monopoly may stifle creativity in certain circumstances
since it also extends to the author the right to prepare derivative
works,9 2 a second author may be discouraged from building upon
88. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.08[B] (1991) (discussing English origins of American copyright scheme and
scope of writings protected by copyright). According to Nimmer, "[a]t one ex-
treme, the defendant's use of a copyrighted work in an advertising context is prob-
ably least likely tojustify a fair use defense, even if the plaintiff's copyrighted work,
as well as defendant's use thereof, were both for advertising purposes." Id. at
§ 13.05[A] I] [c].
89. For a general historical perspective of copyright law, see Marks, supra note
87, at 1381-83; see also ROBERT A. GoRMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT 1-12
(5th ed. 1999).
90. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (discussing the economic phi-
losophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights).
This philosophy encourages individual effort because "personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Sci-
ence and useful Arts.'" Id. "Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities de-
serve rewards commensurate with the services rendered." Id. But see Feist Publ'ns,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-51 (1991) (determining that ultimate
goal of copyright law is to encourage production of new works and not necessarily
to compensate author of such works).
91. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (1982)
(determining that dual aims of copyright-financial incentive to authors and pro-
motion of science and useful arts-rarely conflict because authors are given ade-
quate compensation for their efforts); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001). Section 106
states that an author has the exclusive rights:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2)
to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to dis-
tribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in
the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994) ("The subject matter of copyright . . .in-
cludes compilations and derivative works ...."). A derivative work transforms or
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the work of the original author during the existence of the original
copyright.
With the dual aims of copyright law93 at the forefront of its
considerations, the fair use doctrine is quite possibly the most sig-
nificant limitation of copyright protection 94 and remains an affirm-
ative defense to copyright infringement.95 As ajudge-made rule of
reason,96 Congress deliberately created a vague statute when it en-
acted section 107.97 This statute enumerates four factors that in-
clude an examination of the purpose and character of use, the
nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole and
the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.98 These factors are weighed in the aggregate. 99
Although Congress did not assign relative weights to these statutory
adapts one or more preexisting works such that the product incorporates an origi-
nal work of authorship. See Ronald Urbach, Protection and Use of Copyrightable Mate-
rial in the New Media Age, 775 PLI/Comm. 449, 463 (1997).
93. The dual aims of copyright law are to stimulate creativity and to dissemi-
nate knowledge in order to enrich culture and foster the growth of learning for
the public welfare. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) (delineating between immediate effect of copyright law to secure fair re-
turn for author's creative work and ultimate aim to stimulate artistic creativity).
94. See Marks, supra note 87, at 1377 and accompanying text. After stating
that the fair use doctrine is perhaps the most significant limitation on copyright
protection, Marks contemplates that because the doctrine arose out ofjudicial rec-
ognition that "certain acts of copying are defensible when the public interest in
permitting the copying far outweighs the author's interest in copyright protec-
tion," it permits "copying of otherwise protected expression 'to such a quantitative
or qualitative degree that absent a valid fair use claim, judgment for plaintiff is
mandated.'" Id. (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT
LAw, 413 (2d ed. 1995)).
95. See id. See generallyJeannette R. Busek, Copyright Infringement: A Proposal for
a New Standard for Substantial Similarity Based on the Degree of Possible Expressive Varia-
tion, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1777, 1782-85 (1998) (explaining Copyright Act and copy-
right infringement).
96. See Marks, supra note 87, at 1377 and accompanying text.
97. See id. at 1377-78. Marks contemplates that Congress intentionally neither
sought to change prior law nor inhibit future judicial development for the purpose
of remaining loyal to the original common law character of the doctrine. See id.
The doctrine finds origin in Folsom v. Marsh, where Justice Story articulated a set of
formulations on how to approach the concept of fair use which was later codified
in section 107 of the Copyright Act. See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841).
98. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2001).
99. See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 137 F.3d 109 at 112-13 (2d Cir.
1998). The court emphasized that the aggregate weighing signifies a modification
of the court's previous view that the fourth factor was the most prominent element
in the balance of the four factors. See id. at 113. But see Martin Flumenbaum &
Brad S. Karp, Court Twice Rejects "Fair Use" Defense, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 26, 1998, at 3
(stating that Copyright Act supports individual-episode analysis, not aggregate
analysis).
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factors, courts are given discretion to value each factor
disproportionately.100
The affirmative defense of fair use was inculcated under copy-
right law to address the excessive protection received by an original
author to prepare derivative works.10' The fair use defense "per-
mits other people to use copyrighted material without the owner's
consent in a reasonable manner for certain purposes."'0 2 Unrea-
sonable use of the original work can be shown by direct evidence
that the defendant copied the material or that the defendant not
only had "access to the plaintiff's copyrighted work," but also that
the "defendant's work is substantially similar to the plaintiffs copy-
rightable material."'01 3 Courts, however, will construe section 107 of
the 1976 Copyright Act to permit a fair use defense for works of
parody,'0 4 as such works "are valued forms of criticism, encouraged
because this sort of criticism itself fosters the creativity proposed by
the copyright law."1 05 Therefore, a defendant who takes a substan-
tive amount of copyrighted material, without securing the permis-
sion of the owner, may defend the parody as a fair use of the
original work.
In examining the fair use question, courts look to a set of for-
mulations originally articulated by Justice Story in Folsom v.
100. See Marks, supra note 87, at 1378 and accompanying text. Furthermore,
Marks explores the problems arising from the lack of judicial guidance that have
made the area of alleged copyright infringement of unpublished materials "partic-
ularly prickly." See id.
101. See Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 112 (asserting that both sides disagree only to
availability of affirmative defense of fair use since there is no dispute over plain-
tiff's prima facie case of infringement).
102. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992).
103. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir.
1992).
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001). Fair uses listed in the statute include the use
of copyrighted works for "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... schol-
arship, or research." Id. However, "types of uses beyond the six enumerated in the
preamble to section 107 may be considered. Parody is a common example of such
a use." H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 3 n.6 (1992); see also Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin
Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997) (determining that "[p]arody
is regarded as a form of social and literary criticism, having a socially significant
value").
105. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310. Additionally, copyright law acts as a practical
device that provides benefits for authors and artists. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1109 (1990). In recognizing the benefits
copyright law confers on authors and artists, Leval noted that such benefit is con-
ferred in order to promote the intellectual and practical enrichment that ema-
nates from creative and innovative activity. See id. Leval concluded that copyright
law is therefore necessary to attain this goal. See id.
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Marsh.10 6 These formulations were later codified in section 107
of the Copyright Act. 10 7 This set of formulations includes four
factors to be evaluated in determining whether the use of the
work is fair use.108 Fair use analysis proceeds on a case-by-case
106. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). Justice Story identified a
number of factors for consideration, including the "nature and objects of the selec-
tions made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which
the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of
the original work." Id. at 348.
107. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (2001). Congress codified the common law con-
cept of fair use in the Copyright Act: "The fair use of a copyrighted work ... for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right." Id.
108. See Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132,
141 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107). The four factors include: (1) the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is of nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2001).
The first of the fair use factors examines both the purpose and character of
the use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2001). In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569
(1994), the Supreme Court faced a commercial parody that was asserted to be a
fair use and held that for the first factor, the critical inquiry entailed whether the
second work "adds something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words,
whether and to what extent the new work is 'transformative."' See Campbell, 510
U.S. at 570. The Court went on to state, "the more transformative the new work,
the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may
weigh against a finding of fair use." Id. See also David Goldberg & RobertJ. Bern-
stein, Demi Moore, Dr. Seuss and Seinfeld: Fair Use, N.Y. L.J., May 16, 1997, at 1 (stat-
ing that the existence of "transformative" purpose does not guarantee a successful
claim of fair use). Additionally, the justification for a transformative purpose must
supersede the remaining factors that favor the copyright holder. See Leval, supra
note 105, at 1111. Although "transformative" use of the original work is imperative
under this factor, it is not determinative for a finding of fair use because this factor
must be weighed in the aggregate in relation to the remaining three factors. See
Leval, supra note 105, at 1116 and accompanying text. Leval states that though a
finding of justification under the first factor is imperative to the warranting of a
fair use defense, this factor should be weighed against the remaining factors, keep-
ing in mind the copyrights owner's incentives and ownership rights. See id.
The second statutory factor concerns the nature of the copyrighted work. See
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. This factor represents the acknowledgement that cer-
tain works are closer to the heart of copyright than others; fair use is therefore
more difficult to establish when a corework is copied than when an infringer takes
material that falls only marginally within copyright protection. See id. at 586
("[F]air use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied....");
see, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990) (contrasting a fictional short
story with factual works); Feist Publics. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-51
(1991) (contrasting creative works with bare factual compilations). Analysis of the
second statutory factor hinges upon whether the work is a collection of facts rather
than a creative or imaginative work. See Alexandra Lyras, Incidental Artwork in Tele-
vision Scene Backgrounds: Fair Use of Copyright Infringement?, 2 FoRDHANM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 159, 182 (1992) (stating that when the copyrighted material is
2002]
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collection of facts, fair use doctrine allows more liberal use of copyrighted work);
see Stewart, 495 U.S. at 207. The Supreme Court in Stewart held that the scope of
fair use is narrower for fictional works than for factual works. See Stewart, 495 U.S.
at 207. In Stewart, the holder of rights in a magazine story brought an infringe-
ment action against the holders of rights in a motion picture that had been cre-
ated from the story. See id. Though the district court granted relief in favor of the
holders of rights in a motion picture who created the derivative work under the
fair use analysis, the Ninth Circuit later reversed this decision and the Supreme
Court affirmed based upon the same four factor fair use analysis. See id. at 207.
The rationale of this consideration lies in the idea that certain works are closer to
the "heart" of the original than others and that a finding of fair use is less likely for
a work that is copied than one which comments upon or conjures up the copy-
righted work. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348-51 (contrasting factual works with fictional
works considered to be creative).
Turning to the third factor regarding the amount and substantiality of the
portion use in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, the Campbell Court
adopted the rule developed in prior case law that because the humor of parody
necessitates a readily recognizable reference to the underlying original work, a
parodist is entitled to make use of as much of the first work as is required to "con-
jure up" the original. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588 ("[T]he parody must be able to
'conjure up' at least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit
recognizable."). Further, the Court held that the parodist can use more of the
original than the minimum amount necessary to assure identification provided
that the parody is either targeted at the underlying work or will not serve as a
market substitute for the original. See id. (stating once enough has been taken to
assure identification, how much more is reasonable will depend on, for example,
extent to which song's overriding purpose and character is to parody original or,
in contrast, likelihood that parody may serve as market substitute for original).
Finally, Souter of the Campbell Court recognized that parodic copying of the
"heart" of the original work is not an excessive use because the parody would likely
be recognizable without the use of the more memorable part of the original. See
id. (stating that if parodist had copied significantly less memorable part of original,
it is difficult to see how its parodic character would have come through).
The final factor considers the "effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2001). Because fair use is
an affirmative defense, the Court reasoned that the burden of proving lack of mar-
ket impairment shifts to the defendant. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. Although no
single element of the fair use test is dispositive, in light of the underlying purposes
of copyright, the Supreme Court has recognized that its final factor is "undoubt-
edly the single most important element of fair use." See Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). The centrality of this factor re-
sults not from courts according disproportionate weight to it, but from its close
link to the other fair use factors, including the purpose and character of the use
and the extent of the portion taken. See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
948 F. Supp. 1214, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating parody as genre occupies differ-
ent position than other assertedly fair uses, because parodist is entitled to damage
market for original, but only in certain ways). The underlying idea behind this
factor is the acknowledgement that copyright is not an inherent right in author-
ship. See Leval, supra note 105, at 1124. An important inquiry is whether "[t]he
use tends to interfere with the sale of the copyrighted article." Id. The idea be-
hind copyright is to allow authors the chance to garner rewards by encouraging
them to create works. See id. A secondary user's gross interference with an au-
thor's pursuits would undermine this goal of copyright. See id. See Mura v. Colum-
bia Broad. Sys., 245 F. Supp. 587, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See generally Adrienne J.
Marsh, Fair Use and New Technology: The Appropriate Standards to Apply, 5 CARDozo L.
REv. 635, 643 (1984).
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basis. 109 Furthermore, the analysis will always be considered in light
of the primary objective of copyright law - to "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts." 110
Although fair use is an extremely flexible common law doc-
trine that developed over time, this approach, nevertheless, has its
drawbacks. In the burgeoning business environment of entertain-
ment, advertisements, celebrities and their attorneys, an ad hoc ap-
plication of the four relative factors of the fair use doctrine remains
impractical and not tailored enough to meet the time-sensitive
needs of the celebrity-oriented business. Furthermore, the com-
plex nature of the copyright process dictates a need for a more elas-
tic approach in defining the relationship between the public figure
and the public.
Additionally, application of the fair use doctrine ignores the
specific industry of celebrity-based business. The fair use doctrine's
application has been limited mostly to literary property and thus,
although the first two prongs of the test are relevant to a right of
publicity analysis, the remaining factors are applied as a formality
and require unwarranted legal reasoning that unnecessarily wastes
judicial resources.
An illustration of the application of the fair use model demon-
strates the failure of the doctrine to meet right of publicity con-
cerns. Purpose and character of usage are relevant concerns in the
determination of whether a celebrity may or may not be afforded
legal protection. However, the third factor of "effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of [one's identity]"" is out-
weighed by the First Amendment concerns discussed in the next
section. 12 The fourth prong of "amount and substantiality" of use,
though relevant in the context of literary property where multiple
pages of a text are lifted as part of another text, remains largely
inapplicable and irrelevant to publicity claims. When a celebrity's
identity has been exploited, a wrongful commercial gain has been
obtained, whether the use was minimal or not.' 13 This gain must
have been the purpose of evoking the celebrity's image; as such, the
109. See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 141 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)).
110. Id.
111. Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1137-
1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
112. For a further discussion of First Amendment concerns, see infra notes
115-31 and accompanying text.
113. SeeAllen v. Nat'l Video, 610 F. Supp. 612, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Onassis v.
Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), affd,
488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
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amount and substantiality of use becomes irreconcilable with the
wrongful commercial benefit already obtained. 114
B. First Amendment Concerns
Despite the fact that the First Amendment has not been the
focus of right of publicity analyses in courts, 115 it is, nevertheless,
directly implicated because the right of publicity involves a commu-
nicative tort.116 The First Amendment was designed by the Framers
of the Constitution to protect the freedoms of speech and press."17
In Whitney v. California,l'8 Justice Brandeis in 1927 outlined the un-
derlying goals of the First Amendment for safeguarding free
114. See Wendtv. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozin-
ski,J., dissenting). Additionally, in his dissent to an en banc hearing, Judge Kozin-
ski presages that just as state law regulating the length of trucks is invalid under the
Dormant Commerce Clause if it poses an undue burden on interstate commerce,
so too is a state's right of publicity law invalid if it substantially interferes with
federal copyright law, even absent preemptive legislation.
115. See Frank, supra note 67, at 1136 (discussing lack of First Amendment
attention by courts in right of publicity analyses); Halpern, supra note 4, at 868
(discussing same). Frank propounds that courts do not consider First Amendment
concerns in right of publicity analyses because courts view an individual as merely
seeking compensation for use of his or her identity. See Frank, supra note 67, at
1136. Accordingly, the plaintiff does not seek to withhold appropriation of iden-
tity altogether. See id.
116. See Halpern, supra note 4, at 867 ("By its nature, the right of publicity
implicates speech: whatever else it may be, the right of publicity involves a commu-
nicative tort. Of course, such a characterization merely starts - and does not
resolve - a First Amendment inquiry."); Hetherington, supra note 4, at 21 ("The
most forceful argument against a wholesale extension of the right of publicity can
be found in the First Amendment's policy of promoting the free flow of ideas
essential to vigorous public discourse."); see also Peter L. Felcher & Edward L.
Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J.
1577, 1577 n.2 (1979). Hetherington argues that the First Amendment is not an
absolute limitation on the right of publicity. See Hetherington, supra note 4, at 21.
James Barr Haines, in First Amendment II: Developments in the Right of Publicity, 1989
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211, 225-26 (1989) also delineates the conflict between right of
publicity and First Amendment. Specifically, Haines states:
By protecting the freedoms of speech and the press, the [F] irst [A] mend-
ment promotes democratic self-government, facilitates the search for
truth, and protects the free flow of information through such media as
magazines, newspapers, television, and film. At the same time, the right
of publicity creates an exclusive right in an individual to the commercial
use of his or her identity. The [F]irst [A]mendment and the right of
publicity conflict when a person commercially benefits from a constitu-
tionally protected use of another's identity.
Id.
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." Id.
118. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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speech: the enlightenment function; the self-fulfillment function;
and the safety valve function. 119 Most courts that have considered
First Amendment concerns in right of publicity issues delineate be-
tween uses of identity that are purely commercial as opposed to
uses of free speech that are protected. 120 A balance of interests,
therefore, presents a difficult task that introduces challenging pol-
icy questions for the courts. 21
119. See id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally Melville B. Nimmer,
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, §§ 1.02-04 (1984); Hetherington, supra note 4, at
190-91. With regard to the enlightenment function, Hetherington states that it
encompasses news as well as entertainment, and that the bulk of constitutional
doctrine has developed under the armor of the enlightenment function. See Heth-
erington, supra note 4, at 190. The second reason for safeguarding free speech
under the Brandeis formula is the self-fulfillment function. Brandeis suggests that
freedom of speech is an end in itself because it serves to validate the humanity of
the speaker, thus serving not only the political needs of democracy but also of the
human spirit. See id. at 190-91. Hetherington also notes that such self-expression
encourages the development of political and social ideas intrinsic to a healthy soci-
ety. See id. The safety valve function has not played a significant role in right of
publicity analyses, primarily because of its political entanglement. See id. at 191. In
particular, Hetherington states:
The safety valve function has not played a part in the development of the
right of publicity, probably because the factors at work are more exclu-
sively political. Brandeis formulated this branch as a means of preventing
violence in the pursuit of political goals, suggesting that speech advocat-
ing these goals would release the emotions in a non-violent setting. The
right of publicity must be crafted so as to facilitate these important consti-
tutional values, while providing the breathing space necessary for free
speech rights to flourish. The restrictions on the use of one's personality
must be clearly delineated to accommodate the enlightenment and self-
fulfillment functions. As one court urged in an early right of publicity
case, "[o]ne must never lose sight of the purpose behind the decisions
implementing the First Amendment."
Id.
120. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988)
(discussing media's use of identity as cynosure of examination); see also Felcher &
Rubin, supra note 116, at 1596 ("If [the purpose of the portrayal] serves an inform-
ative or cultural function, it will be immune from liability; if it serves no such func-
tion but merely exploits the individual portrayed, immunity will not be granted.").
121. See Robinson, supra note 43, at 198 ("Weighing First Amendment princi-
ples against the right of publicity is a difficult task."); see also Frank, supra note 67,
at 1136 ("The other major block towards recognizing a First Amendment defense
in these [right of publicity] cases has been the slight protection granted commer-
cial speech."). Frank notes that the level of First Amendment protection is signifi-
candy lowered when a commercial interest is involved, thus making it more
difficult for a defendant to prove his right to freedom of expression has been vio-
lated. See Frank, supra note 67, at 1136. See generally Halpern, supra note 4, at 868
(discussing First Amendment concerns in right of publicity). Halpern states that:
[At] the outer edges of the right of publicity, there may be challenging
questions of policy. For example, imitation and impersonation create dif-
ficult issues; interests must be balanced in order to protect the personality
interest from appropriation while preserving the equally deserving areas
of parody, satire, and self-conscious impersonation.
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The Supreme Court directly balanced First Amendment con-
cerns against right of publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co.12 2 Coined the "human cannonball" case, the Court
agreed with Zacchini by a five-four margin that the filming of his
human cannonball performance at a county fair in Ohio by a televi-
sion reporter with a movie camera constituted an "unlawful appro-
priation [of his] professional property."' 23 In balancing Zacchini's
allegation against the defendant newspaper's argument that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments protected its right to broadcast
Zacchini's entire performance without compensation,1 24 the Court
historically recognized the right of publicity as an established cause
of action with significant rational and economic underpinnings. 125
The facts in Zacchini were unusual, and the Court's narrowly tai-
lored decision did not "deliberately or otherwise... establish a gen-
eral test balancing the right of publicity against First Amendment
freedoms." 126 The Zacchini decision therefore, left the possibility of
preemption of state publicity right laws, based upon federal copy-
right or First Amendment grounds, an open playing field.
Decisions following Zacchini generally hold that First Amend-
ment concerns preempt right of publicity interests. 127 Invariably,
courts subordinate interests protected by the right of publicity
under competing free speech interests when faced with a conflict
between the two. 1 28 For example, the Tenth Circuit held that the
First Amendment preempted the right of publicity in an Oklahoma
case that arguably involved commercial speech.' 29 Similarly, a New
York district court held likewise. 130 Furthermore, in Pennsylvania, a
122. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
123. Id. at 564.
124. See id. at 565 (noting issue of First and Fourteenth Amendment immu-
nity from damages for alleged infringement of right of publicity unresolved).
125. See Robinson, supra note 43, at 187-88 (discussing Zacchini and potential
application of balancing right of publicity against First Amendment).
126. Id. at 197-98.
127. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d
959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding right of publicity preempted when balanced against First Amendment
interests); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(finding First Amendment took precedence over plaintiffs publicity rights).
128. See Haines, supra note 116, at 226 ("[C]ourts almost invariably
subordinate the interests protected by the right of publicity to competing free
speech interests.").
129. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 968, 976 (holding First Amendment preempted
Oklahoma's right of publicity statute which closely parallels sections 990 and 3344
of California Civil Code).
130. See N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 987 F. Supp. 254, 266-68
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (invoking First Amendment and judicial exceptions to New York's
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district court held that the First Amendment preempted the state's
common law right of publicity.131
IV. ALL EYEs ARE WATCHING WENDT V. HOST
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
In Wendt v. Host International, Inc.,132 the Ninth Circuit asserted
a broad interpretation of the right of publicity. 133 The court ex-
panded the purview of publicity protection to include mechanical
reproduction. 134 Actors George Wendt and John Ratzenberger of
the popular television show "Cheers" sued Host International, Inc.
("Host") and Paramount Pictures Corporation ("Paramount")
claiming that both companies violated their publicity rights.13 5
Host obtained a license from Paramount to create a chain of bars at
airports based on the television show "Cheers." 136 In each of these
restaurants or bars, Host placed "three dimensional" animatronic
figures that bore the likeness of plaintiffs' characters on
"Cheers." 137 Plaintiffs Wendt and Ratzenberger, who respectively
right of publicity statute to deny New York Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani's attempt to
enjoin commercial exploitation of his name).
131. See Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(marking unsuccessful invocation of common law right of publicity against makers
of docudrama Panther by former Black Panther leader Bobby Seale).
132. 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Paramount Pictures v. Wendt,
531 U.S. 811 (2000).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 810 (holding issues of material fact exist concerning degree to
which animatronic reproductions of plaintiffs' characters on TV show resembled,
caricatured, or bear impressionistic resemblance to appellants).
135. See Wendt, 125 F.3d. at 809. In his dissenting opinion whereby a petition
for rehearing was denied and a petition for rehearing en banc was rejected for the
case at bar, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit fondly remembered the popular
television series, "Cheers":
Though a bit dated now, "Cheers" remains near and dear to the hearts of
many TV viewers. Set in a friendly neighborhood bar in Boston, the show
revolved around a familiar scene. Sam, the owner and bartender, enter-
tained the boys with tales of his glory days pitching for the Red Sox.
Coach piped in with sincere, obtuse advice. Diane and Frasier chattered
self-importantly about Lord Byron. Carla terrorized patrons with acerbic
comments. And there were Norm and Cliff, the two characters at issue
here. Norm, a fat, endearing, oft-employed accountant, parked himself
at the corner of the bar, where he was joined by Cliff, a dweebish mail-
man and something of a know-it-all windbag. After eleven years on the
air, the gang at "Cheers" became like family to many fans, ensuring many
more years in syndication.
Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1285 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski,J., dissent-
ing) (citing Gebe Martinez, "Cheers"Fans Cry in Their Beers as Sitcom Ends Long Run,
L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1993, at B1.).
136. See Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1285.
137. See id.
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played the characters of Norm and Cliff on "Cheers," sued the de-
fendant Host for the use of animatronic robotic figures based upon
their physical likenesses in restaurants or bars without their con-
sent.138 The plaintiffs' claims were grounded upon an allegation of
violations of both trademark law and publicity rights. 139 Plaintiffs
claimed that when restaurant patrons saw the two animatronic
figures named "Bob" and "Hank," the physical likeness of the ani-
matronic figures would be reminders of Wendt and
Ratzenberger.140 The Ninth Circuit permitted plaintiffs to main-
tain a common law right of publicity claim, 141 as well as a statutory
right of publicity claim under the California Civil Code. 142
Although the court held that an actor does not possess rights
to his or her character, 143 the court permitted an actor to claim a
violation of the right of publicity if the misappropriation identifies
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 809.
141. See id. at 811-12 (analyzing common law right of publicity claim). The
court considered the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs should not be al-
lowed to claim appropriation of identity, commonly known as "right of publicity,"
because the animatronic figures appropriate only the identities of the characters
Norm and Cliff, not the identities of Wendt and Ratzenberger, and Paramount
owned the copyrights to such characters. See id. at 811. In response to this claim,
the court reasoned that "[w]hile it is true that appellants' fame arose in large part
through their participation in Cheers, an actor or actress does not lose the right to
control the commercial exploitation of his or her likeness by portraying a fictional
character." Id. (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979)).
142. See id. at 810. The court permitted a statutory claim because material
facts existed as to the "likeness" of robots to plaintiffs. See id. In its analysis of a
statutory right of publicity claim, the court concluded from its own inspection of
the robots that material facts existed that might cause a reasonable jury to find
them sufficiently "like" plaintiffs to violate section 3344 of the California Civil
Code. See id. California Civil Code § 3344 provides in relevant part:
(a]ny person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, pho-
tograph, or likeness, in any manner .... for purposes of advertising or
selling .... without such person's prior consent.., shall be liable for any
damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997). In response to defendants' claims that plain-
tiffs' claims are preempted by federal copyright law, the court reasoned as in Wendt
Ithat plaintiffs' "claims are not preempted by the federal copyright statute so long
as they 'contain elements, such as the invasion of personal rights . . . that are
different in kind from copyright infringement.'" Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810 (quoting
Wendt v. Host Int'l Inc., 1995 WL 11571, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1995) ("Wendt
r)).
143. See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 811. The court noted that the actors did not even
attempt to claim that a proprietary interest vests in a character that is associated
with the actor. See id. The actors argued instead that the animatronic figures,
"Bob" and "Hank" were "not related to Paramount's copyright of the creative ele-
ments of the characters Norm and Cliff." Id.
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the actor. 1 4 4 The upshot of the Wendt court's decision was that it
denied the expansion of the right of publicity to include exploita-
tion of characters, and couched right of publicity protection in the
determination of whether the appropriated images resembled the
actors. The court's failure to expand protection to characters is
common to a majority of opinions dealing with right of publicity
issues.145 On balance, courts are hesitant to provide a celebrity with
an interest in a character that the celebrity neither owns, nor
developed. 146
V. A DEFINITIVE PERSPECTIVE MUST BE FOLLOWED: THE NEED FOR
A FEDERAL STATUTE
Over twenty-seven states currently recognize the right of pub-
licity.1 47 Although these states have enacted statutes that recognize
this right,'4 8 others rely on common law for protection of their indi-
vidual rights.1 49 States that do not explicitly recognize a right of
publicity find justification for protection under privacy law.1 50
Circuit courts remain split over right of publicity issues under
varying schemes involving state statutes, common law, privacy based
144. See id. The court further explained that an actor's portrayal of a charac-
ter does not negate the ability to control exploitation of his or her own image
despite the fact that the actor cannot have a property interest in his or her charac-
ter. See id.
145. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 976
(10th Cir. 1996) (deciding First Amendment fights outweigh right of publicity).
146. See, e.g., Wendt, 125 F.3d at 811.
147. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 3344 (West 1997) (recognizing fight of publicity).
At least twenty-seven states recognize right of publicity. See McCARTHY, supra note
65, § 6.2, at 6-6. States that have recognized the right of publicity under common
law include: Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania (California, Florida, Texas, Utah and Wiscon-
sin recognize the right of publicity under statutory law). See id. § 6.1, at 6-7 to 6-8;
see also Lisa M. Ferri & Robert G. Gibbons, Outside Counsel, Skirting the Right of
Publicity in the Wake of "Hoffman v. Capital Cities," 221 N.Y. L.J. 8, 8 n.17 (Feb. 26,
1999) (stating over half of all states recognize right by statute of common law). See
generally Haines, supra note 116, at 215-25 (evaluating current right of publicity
statutes).
148. For examples of such statutes, see supra note 147 and accompanying
text.
149. See Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir.
1998) ("We read Alabama's commercial appropriation privacy right . . . to re-
present the same interests and address the same harms as does the right of public-
ity as customarily defined."). See also McCARTHY, supra note 65, § 6.1, at 6-7 to 6-8
(listing states with common law right).
150. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West 1989); N.Y. Crv.
RIGHTS LAw, §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1-839.3
(West 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to 1108 (2001); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8.0140 (Michie 2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1997).
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statutes, and no statute at all. Most prominently, four cases illus-
trate the unresolved conflicts that are the upshot of a lack of a de-
finitive perspective.
In Cheatham v. Paisano Publications, Inc.151 for example, the
Kentucky district court judge permitted an assertion of a right of
privacy action based on an appropriation of the "likeness" of
Cynthia Cheatham's derriere photographed and subsequently pub-
lished in a magazine and printed on t-shirts without her permis-
sion. 152 In so ruling, the court cited Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,153 which
awarded damages to recognized recording artist, Tom Waits, for a
violation of California's voice misappropriation statute because
Frito-Lay utilized a vocalist in an advertisment that sounded like
Waits without his consent. 154 The jury award of $200,000 compen-
sated for injury to Waits' peace, happiness and feelings to stand in a
case primarily involving unauthorized commercial exploitation of a
celebrity's vocal identity. 155 In citing the Ninth Circuit, however,
the Kentucky court's decision marks the confusion arising from a
lack of a definitive perspective dating back to Haelan by holding
that the plaintiff would have a cause of action only if the distinctive
fishnet design of her jeans was recognized by friends and
customers.156
Under a dual common law and statutory schema, the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Wendt discussed in the previous section broad-
151. 891 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
152. See id. at 387. It is notable that Kentucky only recognizes the common
law right of publicity as an offshoot of privacy rights. See id. at 384-85.
153. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
154. See Cheatham, 891 F. Supp. at 387 (citing Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098, 1101-
06).
155. See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1111-12. See also Robinson, supra note 43, at 199
n.120 (1990). Robinson states that Waits underscored two major problems with
the state law right of publicity system:
(1) In a venue well versed on publicity rights, the Ninth Circuit tied the
right of publicity to emotional distress. Though emotional distress
was not a prerequisite for bringing the action, its presence in the
damage award only serves to further widespread confusion about the
role of publicity rights. This confusion seems to have affected the
jury, which awarded Waits twice as much for psychic injury as it
awarded him for the fair market value of his professional services.
(2) While Waits recouped attorney's fees under the Lanham Act, he
could not have recouped the fees on a state action for voice appro-
priation alone. Waits had to piggy-back his state publicity rights
claim onto the federal claim in order to be reimbursed for attorney's
fees. These problems, among others, point to the need for a uni-
form federal statute.
Id.
156. See Cheatham, 891 F. Supp. at 387.
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ened the scope of California's right of publicity law in the context
of animatronic reproductions of celebrity likeness. 15 7 In contrast,
under a New York privacy statute, which does not recognize a com-
mon law right of publicity, the Southern District of New York re-
jected plaintiff Astrud Gilberto's request for a right of privacy
action based on defendant's unauthorized use of her voice in an
advertisement.15 8  Specifically, the Frito-Lay advertisement por-
trayed "Miss Piggy" lip-synching Gilberto's recording of "The Girl
From Ipanema," while gorging her face with potato chips. 159 Due
to the absence of a common law right of publicity recognition in
New York, the plaintiff was forced to bring what amounted to a
right of publicity claim under privacy statutes. 160 Ultimately, the
plaintiff's claim was dismissed because New York law specifically ex-
cludes voice misappropriation under their current statutory
scheme. 161
A case from the Eastern District of Louisiana further illustrates
the ongoing conflict perpetuated as a result of a lack of a single
standard of examination. In Prudhomme v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,' 6 2
for example, the court denied plaintiff Paul Prudhomme's action
alleging a violation of his common law privacy and publicity rights
and effectively, determined that although Louisiana had no right of
publicity statute or common law right of publicity, plaintiff had
made a good faith argument for the extension of the common law
publicity rights doctrine in Louisiana. 163
These conflicting circuit court decisions highlight the poten-
tially endless cycle of inconsistency in right of publicity cases that
seek the guidance of a federal statute. Not only will the inculcation
of a federal statute solve copyright-based preemption questions and
assist in the resolution of First Amendment preemption concerns, it
will also promote consistency and predictability of protection.
In the interest of creating uniformity among court decisions,
Congress should enact a federal statute dealing explicitly with the
right of publicity. Celebrities' livelihood is dependent upon the
157. See Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997).
158. See Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1455, 1460 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
159. See id. at 1457.
160. See id. (noting plaintiff's claim for violation of publicity under N.Y. Crv.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1997)).
161. See id. at 1462. Despite the fact that NewYork Civil Rights Law section 51
was amended to include the unauthorized use of a person's voice in November of
1996, the court dismissed the claim under the statute. See id.
162. 800 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1992).
163. See id. at 395-96.
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protection of their public persona. 64 Moreover, the morass of laws
upon which one may seek protection may encourage practices such
as forum shopping 165 and waste of public and judicial resources. 166
Without a workable federal statute that accounts for the ephemeral,
chameleon, and continually evolving nature of the technological
universe, ongoing confusion among the courts is rendered
inevitable.
VI. CONCLUSION
There has been a plethora of criticism on the scope of the pub-
licity right in the United States. 167 The lack of ajudicially managea-
ble standard from which consistent application of the right of
publicity can take place proposes entry into dangerous territory. 168
The exigency of developing a comprehensive and predictable ap-
proach to celebrity rights is signaled by the rapid permeation of
intellectual property concerns within the United States - a prime
importer and exporter of celebrity status. Not only is a precisely
defined right of publicity stance necessary in the interest of effica-
cious application within the courts, it is also in the interest of the
United States competing in global markets. Public access to popu-
lar culture must be defined so as to avoid infringement upon and
preemption of creativity in commercial transactions involving celeb-
rities, advertisers and the entertainment industry in general.
The Wendt decision represents the nebulous and precarious
position of celebrity rights because every analysis for the right of
164. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977)
(discussing entertainer's livelihood as deriving from activity giving entertainer rep-
utation). For a further discussion of the economic value of a celebrity's identity,
see supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
165. See Robinson, supra note 43, at 201-02 (addressing issue of forum shop-
ping as potential aberration lack of statute may engender).
166. See id. at 201-02 (explaining one commentator's argument that "[a] fed-
eral right of public identity statute would benefit the public, the judiciary and
those who invest time, effort, and money in their personal identities"); Hethering-
ton, supra note 4, at 3 ("A sharply defined right of publicity would provide needed
certainty in legitimate commercial transactions involving celebrities, advertisers
and entertainment concerns while helping guard against overreaching that would
unduly restrict public access to and enjoyment of our popular culture.").
167. For a brief discussion of criticism of right of publicity protection, see
supra note 8 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569-79
(1977) (addressing right of publicity though not comprehensively analyzing right);
Burnett, supra note 6, at 181-82 (noting difference in application of right of public-
ity); Gary M. Ropski & Diane L. Marschang, The Stars' Wars: Names, Pictures and
Lookalikes, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 81, 83 (1989) (addressing various statutes and common
law approaches).
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publicity finds its exegesis in the sole discretion of the court. 169 In
addition to the accoutrements of other intellectual property con-
cerns, the court must determine who is a celebrity, 170 what test
should be applied and whether First Amendment concerns 171 over-
ride Fair Use Doctrine considerations. 172 Furthermore, the court
must assess three issues in every right of publicity action: the status
of the plaintiff as a celebrity, public figure or private citizen; the
nature of the alleged infringing depiction of that person, news, en-
tertainment, art object, advertisement or product; and the motive
of the defendant in so portraying the celebrity. Flaws in the schizo-
phrenic application of publicity protection illuminate a source of
continual confusion among the courts presaging the ultimate rec-
ognition for a comprehensive and precisely tailored model. 173
The lack of a bright line rule leaves a significant challenge for
the courts. 174 Interestingly enough, judges have neither made sub-
stantial efforts to address this concern nor complained over a lack
of guidance in their analysis of cases dealing with celebrity rights.
Thus, courts wield tremendous flexibility in the aggregate assess-
ment of whether or not to afford protection, with earlier decisions
providing little guidance for predicting later ones.175 Notwithstand-
ing a court's evaluation, the weighing of a bundle of discrete factors
169. For a further discussion of the Wendt decision, see supra notes 13246 and
accompanying text.
170. For a further discussion of what defines a celebrity, see supra notes 24-27
and accompanying text.
171. For a further discussion of First Amendment concerns, see supra notes
115-31 and accompanying text.
172. See Frank, supra note 67, at 1141 (suggesting that "the courts would do
well to limit the scope of the right of publicity and temper it in a direction more
amenable to the First Amendment."). Certainly, a federal statute is necessary to
limit the impermissible infringement upon areas constitutionally protected by the
First Amendment. See id. at 1115 ("[S]erious efforts must be made to limit the
encroachment of this personal property fight upon First Amendment fights of free
expression.").
173. See Robinson, supra note 43, at 201-02. Robinson argues that "[a] federal
right of public identity statute would benefit the public, the judiciary, and those
who invest time, effort, and money in their personal identities." Id. Such a call for
a standardized ight of publicity has been made by numerous commentators. See,
e.g., Stephen M. Lobbin, The Right(s) of Publicity in California: Is Three Really Greater
Than One, 2 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 157, 193 (1995). Lobbin stated:
[T]he right of publicity should be brought under one definition-it
should be one fight. And although the legislature has caused much of
the present discontinuity, a legislative solution seems more appropriate
than a judicial one.
Id.
174. For a further discussion of the divergence creating conflict among judi-
cial decisions, see supra notes 151-63 and accompanying text.
175. For a further discussion of these decisions, see supra notes 151-63.
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deemed to be relevant is not likely to lead to convincing or consis-
tent outcomes.
176
With the upsurge of cases arising in the burgeoning field of
celebrity rights, 177 creating a bright line rule for courts to apply is
not only warranted, but becomes a necessity to maintain and ensure
judicial integrity - the upshot being the consistency and steadfast-
ness of the law.178 Due to the fact that celebrities seek to use vari-
ous methods of interpretation including either state right of privacy
statutes, state right of publicity statutes, common law, or no law at
all, there is an increased chance of confusion among the courts. 179
Though a plaintiff may prove victorious in California in a voice imi-
tation case, the same plaintiff may lose in New York.180 Conse-
quently, this encourages practices such as forum shopping.181
Furthermore, the potential shift in focus toward the direct
commercial exploitation of identity relegates the nonpecuniary
concern of protecting identity to mere narrative.' 8 2 Such a shift
begs the question - what is the real issue of right of publicity protec-
tion? Is the crux of right of publicity concerns to promote the eco-
nomic incentives for producing original and creative works,'8 3 or
does it find its origins in the nonpecuniary concerns such as pri-
vacy, reputation, personal autonomy and the "inherent right of
176. For a further discussion of divergent judicial decisions likely leading to
inconsistent outcomes, see supra notes 151-66 and accompanying text.
177. For examples of cases arising out of right of publicity claims, see supra
notes 132-46, 151-63 and accompanying text.
178. For a further discussion of the need for a standardized right of publicity,
see supra notes 147-66 and accompanying text.
179. See Ropski & Marschang, supra note 168, at 99 (noting many variations of
laws under which celebrities will seek protection due to undefined nature of right
of publicity).
180. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1112 (9th Cir. 1992) (permit-
ting voice misappropriation claim); Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1455, 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting voice misappropriation claim).
181. See Robinson, supra note 43, at 201 (addressing whether jurisdiction rec-
ognizing right of publicity encourages forum shopping while discouraging litiga-
tion in another jurisdiction not recognizing such right).
182. See generally Haines, supra note 116, at 214-15. Haines discusses the policy
arguments as follows:
The right of publicity (1) recognizes the economic value of one's identity;
(2) acts as an incentive to creativity by encouraging the production of
entertaining and intellectual works; and (3) prevents the unjust enrich-
ment of those who usurp the identity of another.
Id. (Footnotes omitted); see also Lobbin, supra note 173, at 174 ("There have been
several policy arguments consistently set forth by both courts and commentators in
favor of the right of publicity-namely, moral, economic, distributional, and con-
sumer protection justifications for recognizing the right.").
183. For a further discussion of the purpose of Federal Copyright Law, see
supra notes 81-114 and accompanying text.
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2002] RIGHT OF PUBLICITY PROTECTION 153
every human being to control the commercial use of his or her
identity? ' 18 4 Whether these questions will remain rhetorical ones
depends largely upon the courts and without further inquiry into
the original purpose of offering right of publicity protection, confu-
sion will be compounded and inconsistencies will abound.
Jennifer Y. Choi
184. McCarthy, supra note 23, at 1704; Lobbin, supra note 173, at 158 (noting
"the individual's commercial interest in persona... [is] consistently labeled the
'right of publicity'"); see also McCARThY, supra note 65, § 1.1, at 1-2 (defining right
of publicity as right to control commercial aspects of identity).
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